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Abstract
At the BSRF (Beijing Synchrotron Radiation Facility),
the beam line interlock and control systems have been in
use for over ten years [1]. Since 1995, this system has
been gradually upgraded to improve hardware reliability
and performance, to reduce faults and to provide
additional system functionality. The centralized
monitoring system for BSRF beam lines has also been
redesigned at a reasonable cost. The old controllers have
been replaced with new (Programmable Logic Controller)
PLC-based ones.
1 INTRODUCTION
At present, there are four beam ports and nine beam
lines installed around the BEPC(Beijing Electron-
Positron Collider) storage ring at the BSRF. The nine
photon beam lines include five wiggler X-ray beam lines,
an X-ray UHV compatible beam line, a VUV beam line
and two soft X-ray beam lines. All beam lines share a
common vacuum with the BEPC storage ring. Beryllium
windows are not used for VUV beam lines. For the X-ray
beam lines 0.25-0.5 mm thick beryllium windows are
used to separate the storage ring vacuum from the rough
vacuum in the downstream beam line components, thus
allowing the operation of monochromators, mirror boxes
and sample chambers in rough vacuum or in helium
atmosphere.
Because of beryllium window breakage or other
accidents in beam lines, the possibility of vacuum failures
is substantial. Such a shock wave caused by beryllium
window failure, bellow breakage or gas leakage at the
beam lines will result in serious damage to some
components and the vacuum of the storage ring. A
catastrophic damage would result in machine shutdown
and interrupt the operation of all experimental stations.
To protect the vacuum of the BEPC storage ring and
other beam lines from such catastrophic vacuum failure of
a single beam line, each beam port has been equipped
with an independent vacuum protection system. At the
same time, the protection system can also protect beam
line components from being damaged by thermal loads
produced by high brilliance hard X-rays.
In addition, synchrotron radiation produced by wiggler
or bending magnet is introduced through the beam lines
to the experimental stations. Thus radiation safety
interlock systems are used to provide personnel (users)
access control to prevent inadvertent entry into
experimental stations when hazardous radiation
conditions exist. This will also warn personnel of changes
in safe operating conditions inside the experimental
stations.
Consequently, each beam line interlock and control
system consists mainly of vacuum protection system for




The basic hardware configuration of the centralized
monitoring system is shown in Fig .1.
Fig.1. Block diagram of the hardware configuration for
the centralized monitoring system.
This monitoring system will be used to collect, log, and
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and control systems. The monitoring computer will be
serially connected with 16 sets of FX2NPLCs via the FX-
485PC-IF (RS232/RS485 converter) and the FX2N-485-
BD (RS485 interface from station No. 0 to station No. 15)
communication links [2].
At BSRF, each old beam line interlock and control
system consists mainly of one vacuum protection system
for beam lines and two (or three) radiation safety
interlock systems for experimental stations. In order not
to change the configuration of the old system,
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used to re-
design the controllers in the system. In this system, there
are two types of new PLC-based controllers for each
beam port. One controller is responsible for vacuum
protection system for beam lines, which includes the
vacuum equipment interlock and controls, and the other
controllers are used for the radiation safety interlock
systems for experimental stations. The interlock and
control program for each type of PLC-based controller is
almost the same.
Each new controller includes a Mitsubishi FX2N PLC as
a main hardware device. Each set of PLC consists of a
CPU module, an ADC module, a digital I/O module, and
an RS485 communication link. Each new PLC-based
controller is installed in a separate equipment chassis and
the operating panel is installed in front of each controller
for local operation. All PLC-based controllers can be
serially connected to the centralized monitoring computer
(PC Pentium II) via the FX-485PC-IF (RS232/RS485
converter) and FX2N-485-BD (RS485 interface)
communication links.
The beam line interlock and control systems also
includes 2 programs: One runs in the PLC (the actual
interlock and control programs), which has been
completed, and the other is a user interface and
monitoring program running on the centralized
monitoring computer (PC Pentium II). However, the
monitoring program on the PC is currently under
development.
3 VACUUM PROTECTION SYSTEMS
The main functions of the vacuum protection system for
BSRF beam lines was to protect the BEPC storage ring
and other photon beam lines from sudden catastrophic
vacuum failure at a single beam line. The second goal
was to protect the uncooled beam line components from
exposure to synchrotron radiation and the water-cooled
beam line components from the interruption of the
cooling water flow.
The new hardware for the vacuum protection systems is
based on the PLCs. The basic design requirements and
configurations of the new systems are much the same
with the old systems described previously [1]. The new
PLC-based vacuum interlock system is used to replace the
old relay-based vacuum interlock systems. This includes
FX2N PLC with about 90 I/O points, an ADC module
(FX2N-4AD) with 4 input channels, and a RS485 serial
communication link (FX2N- 485-BD). The I/O points are
used to acquire status from the field devices (e.g.,
positions of water-cooled movable mask, all-metal UHV
valve and fast-closing valve, as well as ionization gauges
output relays, pressure switches for cooling-water flow to
cooled components and compressed air, etc) in addition to
sending commands to them. The ADC channels are used
to read the analogue outputs of ionization gauges. The
PLC-based controller for each vacuum protection system
can be serially connected to a centralized monitoring
computer (Pentium II) via the RS485 link.
The software for the vacuum interlock and controls
involves two tasks: drawing the ladder diagram and
entering it into the PLC via a special packet (MEDOC).
The new PLC-based vacuum controller is a high
reliability fail-safe interlock and control device. The
operating panel is installed in the front of each new PLC-
based controller for local operation.
For the 3W1 high-power (2.54 KW) wiggler beam
lines, the challenge of the PLC-based controller for the
vacuum protection system is to protect the fast-closing
valve from synchrotron radiation when it is triggered to
close. The closure time for the fast-closing valve is less
than 7 milliseconds. In order to prevent the blade of the
fast-closing valve from overheating before the water-
cooled movable mask closes (about 2 seconds of closure
time), a titanium-alloy blade with melting point of 1680
°C is used.
4 RADIATION SAFETY INTERLOCK
SYSTEMS
The new PLC-based controllers for the Radiation
Safety Interlock System (RSIS) replaces the old radiation
safety interlock systems based on relays. Each set of the
PLC-based for the RSIS hardware contains a FX2N PLC
with an RS 485 interface. Components include user
control panel and status displays, door position sensors
(limit switches), electrically-driven door locking
mechanism, search-and-secure boxes, emergency beam-
stop, voice alarm and visible warning indicators, safety
shutter and photon shutter, etc. The equipment cabinet for
each set of the RSIS is placed close to each experimental
station.
Personnel/users access into these stations can be
controlled via the RSIS during beam line operation. The
system hardware provides for emergency beam shut-off
and emergency egress. A station search and secure must
be completed before synchrotron radiation is transported
into a station. During this procedure the users are forced
to depress the search buttons inside the station in a
predetermined sequence and close the station doors
within a given time period (~20 sec) to mark the station
as secure for radiation. Voice alarm and visual indicator
are given during the search process. At the completion of
a successful search, the safety shutter and photon shutter
can be opened if the other interlock conditions are also
satisfied. The opening of the doors and the shutters are
37
fully controlled by the interlock system. In the opposition
way, if one of the interlock conditions is not satisfied,
only one of the two shutters can be opened.
The RSIS control chassis is the station control panel.
This panel is used to open and close safety shutters and
photon shutters, gain safe access to the experimental
station and display the status of the safety shutters and
photon shutters. as well as other devices related to the
RSIS. For example, the LED indicators in the panel are
green if the safety shutters are opened and are red if the
safety shutters are closed.
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